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FEDERAL LAW REQUIREMENTS FOR THE 
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION SYSTEM: 
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION 
Gerard Hildebrand 
Since the creation of the federal-state unemployment com-
pensation (UC) system in 1935, the desirability of federal 
requirements has been a subject of debate. It can only be 
expected that this debate, along with attempts to add to, delete, 
or amend the federal requirements, will continue. An under-
standing of what happens to a federal requirement once it is 
enacted, and of the United States Department of Labor's (DOL) 
general approach toward interpreting and applying the 
requirement, should be a part of any discussion concerning the 
desirability of federal requirements. 
The notion that states generally are free to operate their UC 
programs without dictation from Washington is the major 
influence on DOL's application of federal law. This has had 
varying effects on different types of federal provisions, which 
I divide into three categories for purposes of this Article: discre-
tionary provisions, minimum requirements, and absolute 
requirements. 
I. DISCRETIONARY PROVISIONS 
The main discretionary provision is the requirement in section 
303(a)(l) of the Social Security Act that state law contain such 
"methods of administration ... as are found by the Secretary 
of Labor to be reasonably calculated to insure full payment of 
unemployment compensation when due."1 Over the years, DOL 
largely has interpret~d this requirement to apply only to opera-
tionalizing other federal requirements, such as payment through 
public employment offices, the right to a fair hearing, the 
requirement that amounts withdrawn from the unemployment 
fund be limited to cash payments to individuals. The wide scope 
of this provision would have allowed the Department to create 
1. 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(l) (1988). 
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many more requirements than were created. In fact, since Java, 2 
much of the impetus for interpreting and applying this provision 
has shifted to the courts. 
II. MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS 
Many of the provisions in federal law require states to meet 
only a minimum requirement, which a state is free to go beyond. 
When a new requirement is placed on the states, DOL generally 
has appeared to follow two rules of construction. First, since 
the requirement impinges on areas otherwise left to the states, 
it is construed as narrowly as possible while reasonably 
effectuating the requirement's purpose. The second rule of 
construction, a corollary to the first, requires that any language 
which may be construed as leaving discretion to the states 
should be broadly construed, unless there are compelling reasons 
for a narrow construction. 
For example, the "double dip" provision of section 3304(a)(7) 
of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA),3 the alien provi-
sion of section 3304(a)(14)(A) of FUTA, and the pension de-
duction provision of section 3304(a)(15) of FUTA, allow states 
to be more restrictive but not more liberal than DO L's position. 
On the other hand, the approved training requirement of section 
3304(a)(8) of FUTA has been interpreted in such a way that 
states must only include the basic requirement in their laws; 
what constitutes approved training is up to the states. 
III. ABSOLUTE REQUIREMENTS 
"Absolutes" differ from the "minimum" federal requirements 
discussed above in that states have no latitude under these 
requirements. The "absolute" character of these requirements 
is derived from the federal law itself, which denies DOL 
authority to apply the rules of construction that it uses for 
minimum requirements. 
2. California Dep't of Human Resources Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121 (1971). 
3. FUTA is codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3311 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
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Some absolutes are easy to administer for conformity and 
compliance purposes. An example is the requirement that for 
certain nonprofit organizations and state and local governmental 
entities, states pay UC based on services performed on the same 
terms and conditions as apply to other services covered under 
state law. The "between and within terms denial" is more 
difficult to administer, as is the "systematic and sustained" work 
search effort required for extended benefits (EB). Both in-
correctly assume that all states would make the same determina-
tion given the same set of facts. 
It also is impossible for DOL to provide guidance on every 
situation or to monitor every determination. DOL has, therefore, 
created a framework under which states have at least some 
latitude. In the between and within terms denial, this latitude 
consists of allowing states to determine whether a reasonable 
assurance exists in cases where the economic terms and 
conditions of the employment in the second academic period 
differ from those in the first. The EB "systematic and sustained" 
work search effort simply requires states to make determinations 
under a federal framework, based on the local labor market, 
which allows the actual application to vary considerably from 
state to state. 
A major problem in administering federal requirements is 
that there may be situations in which the requirement may 
be circumvented. This is particularly true with the deposit 
and withdrawal standards of sections 3304(a)(3) and (4) of 
FUTA, which impose restrictions on the states concerning the 
use of the unemployment trusts while in the hands of the 
beneficiary-the state. Because states interpret their own 
laws, however, states could claim that they are adhering to 
standards, while actually circumventing them. For example, 
states have claimed that certain moneys are not unemploy-
ment fund moneys and therefore could be used for non-UC 
purposes, even wheti applicable laws make clear that the 
moneys do belong to the unemployment fund. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS-WHAT TYPE OF FEDERAL 
REQUIREMENTS ARE DESIRABLE? 
Federal requirements work most effectively, from the per-
spective of Federal administration, when they allow states to 
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simply establish specific criteria in their laws. An example is 
the "double dip" requirement, under which state law simply 
establishes the amount of work necessary to establish a second 
benefit year. This type of requirement is easily verified and, 
in most cases, after the state enacts the provision, few conformi-
ty or compliance issues will arise. Requirements which do not 
meet this test should be avoided. When Congress wishes to 
address a specific matter, it should explore whether the federal 
requirement is better framed as a minimum requirement. For 
example, the between and within terms denial provisions of 
federal law could have been framed to require states to create 
provisions providing for such a denial for individuals expected 
to return to educational employment, while leaving it to the 
states to craft the specific provisions. Presumably, educational 
institutions, their employees, and the public sector would work 
jointly to develop equitable provisions. DOL's role would then 
be similar to the approved training requirement-simply to 
assure that the state law contained some provision addressing 
between and within terms situations. This approach might not 
work for every type ofrequirement. For example, for the denial 
of UC to aliens, this solution may not be as viable, since there 
may not be any public or private sector interest in a state for 
creating a meaningful provision of state law. 
The problem with setting certain federal requirements, as in 
the case of approved training, is that states could enact 
provisions oflaw ostensibly designed to meet the requirements, 
which in effect are meaningless. Although it may be impossible 
to frame all standards in a way that prevents states from paying 
lip service to them, Congress should consider seriously this issue 
whenever a requirement is created. It is unlikely that any state 
would approve of any provision that allows DOL to tell the state 
what its law means (which appears to be the only solution for 
the deposit and withdrawal standards); however, it is possible 
to fashion requirements where compliance is easily tested. The 
"double dip" provision, for example, avoids this lip service. Its 
requirement is so clear that a state could not argue that its law 
required work following the beginning of a benefit year unless 
its law actually did. 
Finally, it is obvious that framers of new requirements should 
be careful to assure that the statutory language effectuates their 
intent. This is perhaps even more critical for federal UC 
requirements, given that DOL usually interprets a new provision 
of law as placing the least burden on the states. 
